ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
his paper investigates the impact of the Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation (MAFR) requirement on auditor reporting decision and financial reporting quality using MAFR data in Korean capital markets.
1
After high-profile accounting scandals such as Enron and WorldCom, the U.S. Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) on July 30, 2002 to enhance corporate governance and improve financial reporting quality. SOX prescribes many important requirements with which public companies and their auditors must comply: disclosure requirements for the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting, audit committee independence, or audit partner rotation. At that time, although MAFR was hotly debated among regulators, policy makers, academics, and the auditing profession, U.S. policy makers had not finally adopted the requirement. However, regulators and policy makers who witnessed the global financial crisis during 2007-2009 once again raised doubts regarding the credibility of audited financial statements. Regulators and policy makers, particularly in 1 The Korean audit market provides a unique setting for the study of the effectiveness of the MAFR requirement. In Korea, the MAFR requirement was effective from 2006 to 2010. During that period, MAFR and the Voluntary Audit Firm Change (VAFC) co-existed in Korea's audit market. First, according to the past Korean MAFR requirement, firms cannot keep their same external auditor for six years. Second, firms cannot change their auditors within three years, indicating that auditors are guaranteed at least the first three-year audits for their audit clients. That is, the clients are able to change their auditors three years after the initial audit engagement. Therefore, the research setting in Korea provides us with a unique opportunity to collectively investigate the effect of each of MAFR and VAFC on auditor reporting decisions and accrual quality during the same period.
Although new auditors under MAFR have fresh eyes and are perceived as more objective and independent, they have little knowledge of their new client's business and industry. If the former outweighs the latter, the new auditors are expected to make more appropriate reporting decisions regarding their financial statement audits compared with Voluntary Audit Firm Change (VAFC). In addition, firms audited by new auditors under MAFR are more likely to have better earnings quality. However, if the new auditors lack fresh eyes and independence along with little knowledge of their clients' business and industry, we expect that their reporting decision or clients' earnings quality under MAFR is likely to be unchanged or, perhaps worse, compared with VAFC. Therefore, the association of MAFR with audit quality or earnings quality is still hotly debated and remains an empirically open question.
In this paper, we test the association between FGCOs and earnings quality and MAFR during the first-year financial statement audit compared with VAFC. 4 Consistent with the argument made by MAFR proponents, we find that new auditors under MAFR are more likely to issue a FGCO to financially distressed firms during their initial audits compared with voluntarily switched new auditors after controlling for factors affecting going-concern audit opinion decisions. This result suggests that the mandatorily rotated new auditors make more appropriate reporting decisions through fresh eyes and enhanced independence. We also find that firms audited by mandatorily rotated 2 Recently the European Parliament endorsed proposed mandatory audit firm rotation adoption, which allows public-interest entities (e.g., listed companies, banks, and insurance companies) to keep their auditor up to 10 years, and after that, have to change the auditor. However, the mandatory rotation period can be extended to 20 years if the audit is put out for bid, or 24 years in cases of joint audits (Tysiac, 2014) . 3 Following Dodd et al. (1984) and Loudder et al. (1992) , in this paper, a first-time going-concern audit opinion (FGCO) firm is defined as the firm that received a going-concern opinion for the current fiscal year's financial statements but an unqualified audit opinion for previous fiscal year's financial statements 4 In Korea, both mandatorily rotated and voluntarily switched auditors are only guaranteed their financial statement audit for the first three years from the initial engagement, which cannot be lengthen over six years under Korean MAFR requirement. Thus, with close to third year audit, all auditors' independence may not be impaired due to next three-year audit renewal. Thus, we judge that the first-year audit after mandatory rotation or voluntary change is more appropriate to compare the effectiveness between Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation (MAFR) and Voluntary Audit Firm Change (VAFC). In this study, we focus on the first-year audit engagement.
In Europe, a few countries (e.g., Spain, Italy, and Portugal) adopted MAFR. In Spain, the rotation requirement enacted in 1988 required that audit firms be mandatorily rotated every nine years but was subsequently abolished in 1997. Ruiz-Barbadillo et al. (2009) report that the number of GCOs during the MAFR period did not increase, implying no positive impact of MAFR on audit quality.
5
Italy also adopted MAFR in 1974, requiring firms to switch their auditor every nine years. The SDA Bocconi University Report (2002) shows that MAFR in Italy leads to additional audit costs, stronger concentration of the audit market, and deterioration in audit quality. Meanwhile, the results of interviews and questionnaires conducted with firms' managers and auditors show enhanced public confidence on financial reporting since the MAFR adoption. In addition, Cameran et al. (2014) report lower earnings quality for the first three years following mandatory rotation and higher audit hours and fees in the initial audit year whereas, Corbella et al. (2012) show that firms report more income-decreasing abnormal accruals after MAFR adoption, suggesting that auditors are more conservative in conducting financial statement audits.
6
In Korea, all listed companies on the KSE and KOSDAQ except for foreign companies and domestic companies listed on the foreign stock exchanges such as the NYSE, NASDAQ, or London Stock Exchange were required to mandatorily rotate their auditor every six years. The MAFR requirement was effective only from 2006 to 2010. After the adoption of MAFR in Korea, academic institutions conducted a variety of studies on the impact of MAFR on audit quality and/or financial reporting quality using various proxies such as discretionary accruals (Noh, 2009; Kim and Yu, 2010) , auditor conservatism (Han and Moon, 2009; Kim and Yu, 2011) , and audit fees and hours (Kwon et al., 2011) . As with the studies in other countries that have adopted MAFR requirement, the empirical results are also mixed. The one study shows a neutral or negative impact of MAFR on audit quality and/or financial reporting quality. For example, Noh (2009) failed to find a significant association between MAFR and discretionary accruals. Kim and Yu (2011) find no significant difference in auditor conservatism between mandatorily rotated and voluntarily switched auditors. Using firms listed on the KOSDAQ, Lee and Jeon (2011) show that discretionary accruals of firms audited by auditors under MAFR are higher than those audited under VAFC. Kwon et al. (2011) assert that MAFR increases costs for audit firms and clients but that this increase is not linked to a positive impact on financial reporting quality. The other study shows a positive impact of MAFR on audit quality and/or financial reporting quality. For instance, Han and Moon (2009) provides evidence that MAFR is positively associated with auditor conservatism. Kim and Yu (2010) document that MAFR is significantly and negatively associated with discretionary accruals.
Collectively, consistent with different perspectives among regulator, academics, and auditing profession on MAFR effectiveness, prior literature on the impact of MAFR on financial reporting quality provides mixed results as well.
Hypotheses Development
Under MAFR, two opposing forces may exist. One force is from the fact that a newly rotated auditor can fully exercise its professional skepticism during financial statement audits, thus maintaining independence and objectivity. Such a force produces a high audit quality, resulting in high quality of financial reporting. The other force is from the fact that a newly rotated auditor has little knowledge of its client's business and industry, making it difficult for the auditor to effectively plan the audit. In general, auditors cannot appropriately conduct risk analysis of clients' financial statements without understanding their business and industry. As a result, the auditor cannot completely identify a client's key risk factors, creating a low audit quality and then low quality of financial reporting. The Clute Institute Therefore, the effectiveness of MAFR depends on which of the two forces (i.e., enhanced auditor independence versus lack of understanding of a client's business and industry) dominates. First, with regard to the impact of MAFR on auditor reporting decisions for financially distressed firms, if the force of enhanced auditor independence outweighs the lack of understanding of a client's business and industry, newly rotated auditors under MAFR are expected to issue more appropriate audit opinions to financially distressed firms (e.g., GCOs) compared with newly switched auditors under VAFC. Specifically, newly rotated auditors are expected to be more likely to issue a FGCO to financially distressed firms in their initial audits. In addition, considering that the newly rotated auditors with enhanced independence under MAFR are expected to more conservatively conduct their initial audit of new clients (FGCO firms), we predict that (FGCO) firms audited by these auditors are more likely to have highquality financial reporting such as lower signed discretionary accruals and higher accruals quality. Second, if a lack of understanding of a client's business and industry outweighs the force of enhanced auditor independence, our predictions discussed above will be reversed. Lastly, if the force of enhanced independence is not significantly different from the lack of understanding of a client's business and industry, we do not expect a significant difference in auditor reporting decisions for financially distressed firms during initial financial statement audits or in financial reporting quality between initial audits of (FGCO) firms under MAFR and VAFC. Further, as discussed previously, prior literature also provides mixed results on the impact of MAFR on audit quality and/or financial reporting quality.
Therefore, we develop the following hypotheses (in the null form).
H1:
During first-year audits, no significant difference exists in auditor reporting decisions on a first-time goingconcern audit opinion (FGCO) to financially distressed firms between newly rotated auditors under mandatory audit firm rotation and newly switched auditors under voluntary audit firm change.
H2:
During first-year audits, no significant difference exists in the earnings quality between (FGCO) firms audited by newly rotated auditors under mandatory audit firm rotation and newly switched auditors under voluntary audit firm change.
RESEARCH DESIGN AND SAMPLE AND DATA

Research Design
We test Hypothesis 1, using the following logit model. See Appendix for variable definitions. 
Probability
Following Dodd et al. (1984) and Loudder et al. (1992) , in model (1), the dependent variable, FGCO, is coded 1 for firms that received a going-concern audit opinion for the current fiscal year's financial statements but an unqualified audit opinion for previous year. VAFC and MAFR, the test variables, are equal to 1 for firms that voluntarily changed their auditor and whose auditor is mandatorily rotated, respectively. If mandatorily rotated auditors conduct their audits more independently, we expect that both the coefficient of MAFR and the difference between the coefficients of MAFR and VAFC will be significantly positive. Following prior studies, we control for firm size (SIZE), Big 4 auditors (BIG4), sales growth (GRW), leverage (LEV), profitability (ROA), and financial risk/distress (Z, CZ). SIZE is measured as the logarithm of total assets. Mutchler et al. (1997) suggest that auditors are more likely to issue going-concern audit opinions to smaller firms. Therefore, we expect a negative association between FGCO and firm size (SIZE). The BIG4 variable is included because the Big 4 auditors are less likely to modify the opinions of bankrupt firms (DeFond and Lennox, 2011) . However, the studies of Mutchler et al. (1997) and Kim et al. (2013) find no significant difference between GCO and Big 4 auditors. We control for sales growth (GRW) (Ashbaugh-Skife et al., 2007) . In particular, growing firms are more likely to encounter a variety of internal issues such as internal control, staffing, and a more complex operating environment, which makes it more difficult for financially distressed firms to escape current going-concern issues. We also include the ratio of total liabilities to total book value of equity (LEV). Raghunandan and Rama (1995) and DeFond et al. (2002) find that GCO firms have higher leverage. Therefore, we expect that FGCO is positively correlated with LEV. Less profitable firms are more likely to receive GCO (Mutchler et al., 1997; Lee et al., 2005) ; therefore, we include return on assets (ROA) for firm performance and expect a negative association with FGCO. We control for financial distress and financial risk using the Altman (1964) Z-score (Z) and the change in the Z-score (CZ) (Mutchler, 1984) . In addition, using the finding that the effectiveness of internal monitoring devices (e.g., effective audit committees) is positively correlated with the issuance of GCO (Carcello and Neal, 2003) , we control for the corporate governance variables of large shareholders' holdings (MCG) and foreign shareholders' holdings (FCG). Bruynseels and Willekens (2011) document that liquid or sellable resources such as cash and cash equivalents and property, plant, and equipment can mitigate the issuance of a going-concern audit opinion. Thus, we control for CASH, which is measured as cash and cash equivalents deflated by lagged total assets. Next, to test Hypothesis 2 on the association between MAFR and earnings quality, we use signed discretionary accruals and accruals quality as proxies for earnings quality. First, we explore the association of MAFR with discretionary accruals. Following the model in Kothari et al. (2005) , we measure the performancebased discretionary accruals that reflect firm performance (ROA). The measurement procedure of discretionary accruals is as follows. First, we cross-sectionally estimate the coefficients of model (2) for firms with non-goingconcern audit opinions by year and two-digit industry. Then, these previously estimated coefficients are used to compute discretionary accruals (DA) in model (3) for the sample firms in this study.
Models (2) and (3) are as follows:
where TA represents total accruals measured as net income minus operating cash flows, ΔREV represents change in sales, ΔAR represents change in accounts receivable, PPE represents the gross amount of property, plant, and equipment, and ROA represents return on assets measured as earnings before tax and interests divided by lagged total assets. All variables except for ROA in model (2) are deflated by lagged total assets.
To test the association between a first-time going-concern audit opinion and discretionary accruals under MAFR, we establish model (4) as follows: where the dependent variable is discretionary accruals (DA) and the test variable is the interaction term of FGCO and MAFR. If new auditors under MAFR provide high quality ("more conservative") audits to FGCO firms in their initial audits, we expect that the coefficient of FGCO*MAFR will be significantly negative. Such a result would suggest that newly rotated auditors play a critical role in preventing income-increasing behavior of FGCO firms.
Following prior studies, we control for the factors affecting discretionary accruals, such as firm size (SIZE), book-to-market ratio (BTM), leverage (LEV), operating cash flows (CFO), and sales growth (GRW). Following Becker et al. (1998) , we include firm size (SIZE), which influences discretionary accruals. BTM is a measure of growth opportunities. Butler et al. (2004) document that the book-to-market ratio is negatively associated with discretionary accruals. The debt-to-book value of equity (LEV) is positively associated with discretionary accruals because firms with high debt have an incentive to engage in earnings management to increase earnings (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994) . Operating cash flows (CFO) is expected to be negatively associated with discretionary accruals (Dechow et al., 1998; DeFond and Subramanyam, 1998) . Because growing firms are more likely to invest working capital, such as accounts receivable and inventory, to support current and/or future sales growth, sales growth (GRW) is expected to be positively associated with discretionary accruals. We also control for financial distress using the Altman (1967) Z-score (Z), change in Z-score (CZ), and loss firms (LOSS). We include Big 4 auditors (BIG4) and lagged return on assets (ROA) to control for audit quality and firms' performance, respectively. We also include lagged ROA square to control for the non-linear relationship between firm performance and discretionary accruals (Kothari et al., 2005; Butler et al., 2004) . We include large shareholders' holdings (MCG) and foreign shareholders' holdings (FCG) to control for corporate governance.
Next, accruals quality is another popular proxy for earnings quality (Dechow and Dichev, 2002; Dechow et al., 2011) . Following the McNichols (2002)'s model, which modifies Dechow and Dichev (2002) , we crosssectionally estimate Model (5). Accrual Quality is defined as the studentized residuals estimated Model (5). Larger (smaller) standard deviations of residuals represent lower (higher) accrual quality. Then, we formulate an empirical model (6) to control for factors affecting accrual quality based on a prior relevant study. In model (6) where WCA represents working capital accruals measured as ((Δcurrent assets -Δcash and cash equivalents)-(Δcurrent liabilities -Δshort-term liabilities)), CFO represents operating cash flows, ΔREV represents change in sales, and PPE represents the gross amount of property, plant, and equipment. All variables in model (5) are deflated by lagged total assets.
Sample and Data
Panel A of Table 1 shows the sample selection procedure. The initial sample size is 9,078 non-financial institutions with unqualified audit opinions listed on the Korean stock exchanges from 2006 to 2010. We exclude financial institutions because they have a different financial reporting and operating environment, and we drop 189 firm-year observations because of missing financial data. The final sample is comprised of 8,889 firm-year observations.
We obtain financial data from the KIS-Value and TS-2000 databases. Auditor change and going-concern audit opinions are hand-collected from audit reports available from the Data Analysis, Retrieval and Transfer System (DART, http://dart.fss.or.kr). Table 1 presents a yearly sample distribution of the final sample (n=8,889), which is composed of three subsamples: 1) non-switched firms (n=6,889), 2) voluntarily switched firms (n=1,292), and 3) mandatorily rotated firms (n=708). Each subsample has 388 (183), 142 (45), and 65 (32) GCO (FGCO) firms, respectively. Consistent with the results of Xu et al. (2011) , which reported an increase in GCO firms during global economic recession periods, GCO firms increased during the global financial crisis from 2007 (n=125) to 2008 (n=213). The number (n=382) of mandatorily rotated firms was largest in 2008.
Panel B of
Next, we develop a subsample of financially distressed firms from the full sample; we define such firms as having a net loss or negative operating cash flows. Panel C of Table 1 presents a yearly sample distribution of 3,898 financially distressed firms. The sample size of each of the three subsamples of non-switched firms, voluntarily switched firms, and mandatorily rotated firms is significantly reduced to 2,955, 618, and 325 firm-year observations, respectively. However, the number of GCO or FGCO firms in each subsample is almost unchanged. See Appendix for variable definitions. GCO is equal to 1 for firms that received a going-concern opinion for the current fiscal year's financial statements, and 0 otherwise 0. FGCO is equal to 1 for firms that received a going-concern opinion for the current fiscal year's financial statements but an unqualified audit opinion for previous fiscal year's financial statements. VAFC is equal to 1 if auditors are voluntarily changed, and 0 otherwise. MAFR is equal to 1 if auditors are mandatorily rotated, and 0 otherwise. Financially distressed firms are defined those that have a net loss or negative operating cash flows. Table 3 shows the Pearson and Spearman correlations among the dependent and independent variables used in the empirical models of this study. The Pearson correlations (-0.041 and -0.027, respectively) of VAFC and MAFR with DA are significantly negative, suggesting that both voluntarily switched and mandatorily rotated auditors deter firms' income-increasing behavior in their initial audits. Additionally, the correlations (0.070 and 0.029, respectively) of VAFC and MAFR with GCO are significantly positive, suggesting that both voluntarily switched and mandatorily rotated auditors are more likely to issue going-concern audit opinions in their initial audits. FGCO is positively correlated with VAFC but insignificant, whereas FGCO is significantly and positively correlated with MAFR at the 1 percent level, providing preliminary evidence that newly rotated auditors under MAFR are more likely to issue a first-time going-concern audit opinion. Additionally, as expected, GCO is significantly and positively correlated with LEV and LOSS and significantly and negatively correlated with SIZE and Z. Unexpectedly, GCO is significantly and negatively correlated with BIG4. See Appendix for variable definitions. 3,318 ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test).
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
Correlation Analysis
DA is discretionary accruals measured following Kothari et al. (2005) . GCO is equal to 1 for firms that received a going-concern opinion for the current fiscal year's financial statements, and 0 otherwise 0. FGCO is equal to 1 for firms that received a going-concern opinion for the current fiscal year's financial statements but an unqualified audit opinion for previous fiscal year's financial statements. VAFC is equal to 1 if auditors are voluntarily changed, and 0 otherwise. MAFR is equal to 1 if auditors are mandatorily rotated, and 0 otherwise. Financially distressed firms are defined those that have a net loss or negative operating cash flows. The Clute Institute
Empirical Results of Multivariate Regression Analysis
Relation between Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation and FGCO
To test Hypothesis 1 on the association between MAFR and a first-time going-concern audit opinion decision, we confine the test sample to financially distressed firms following the prior literature. Table 5 presents the results of the logistic regressions after controlling for the factors that affect auditors' GCO decisions. According to the results, the coefficient (0.493) of MAFR is positive and statistically significant (p<0.067), whereas the coefficient (-0.079) of VAFC is negative and statistically insignificant, suggesting that auditors under MAFR are more likely to issue a FGCO to financially distressed firms in their first-year audits compared with auditors under VAFC. These results indicate that newly rotated auditors under MAFR make more conservative reporting decisions than those under VAFC, supporting the adoption of MAFR. See Appendix for variable definitions. 005 Max-rescaled R-square: 0.196 ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). Dependent variable is FGCO, which is equal to 1 for firms that received a going-concern opinion for the current fiscal year's financial statements but an unqualified audit opinion for previous fiscal year's financial statements. VAFC is equal to 1 if auditors are voluntarily changed, and 0 otherwise. MAFR is equal to 1 if auditors are mandatorily rotated, and 0 otherwise. Financially distressed firms are defined those that have a net loss or negative operating cash flows.
Relation between Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation and Discretionary Accruals
Next, we test Hypothesis 2 on the association between MAFR and discretionary accruals. Contrary to previous analysis in Table 5 , we expand our test sample to the full sample. First, we test the association between MAFR and discretionary accruals and between VAFC and discretionary accruals. Table 6 presents the OLS regression results. As shown in Table 6 , we find that the coefficient for VAFC+FGCO*VAFC (MAFR+FGCO*MAFR) is significantly negative at the 5 (1) percent level, suggesting that both voluntarily auditorchanged and mandatorily auditor-rotated firms have relatively lower signed discretionary accruals (i.e., higher earnings quality) compared with auditor-unchanged firms. Also, we find that both coefficients of FGCO*VAFC and FGCO*MAFR are significantly negative at the 1 percent level, indicating that a negative association between auditor change and rotation and discretionary accruals is more pronounced for firms receiving a first-time going-concern audit opinion. Next, we test whether or not the negative association between MAFR and discretionary accruals is stronger than that between VAFC and discretionary accruals. F-test results show that the coefficient difference between (VAFC+FGCO*VAFC) and (MAFR+FGCO*MAFR) or between FGCO*VAFC and FGCO*MAFR is significant at the 1 percent level. Considering that the coefficient (-0.375) of (MAFR+FGCO*MAFR) is more negative than that (-0.110) of (VAFC+FGCO*VAFC) and that the coefficient (-0.382) of FGCO*MAFR is more The Clute Institute negative than that (-0.095) of FGCO*VAFC, the F-test results above suggest that firms audited by mandatorily rotated auditors have lower signed discretionary accruals in their initial audits than firms audited by voluntarily changed auditors. Particularly, the results are more pronounced for firms that received FGCOs from mandatorily rotated new auditors in the initial audits.
Taken together, the all findings above suggest that, although both voluntarily changed and mandatorily rotated new auditors are likely to have fresh eyes and conservatively conduct their first-year financial statement audits, mandatorily rotated auditors are more likely to conduct their initial audits with more conservative fresh eyes, particularly for FGCO firms. See Appendix for variable definitions. No of Obs. 8,889 ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). Dependent variable is DA, which is discretionary accruals measured following Kothari et al. (2005) . GCO is equal to 1 for firms that received a going-concern opinion for the current fiscal year's financial statements, and 0 otherwise 0. FGCO is equal to 1 for firms that received a going-concern opinion for the current fiscal year's financial statements but an unqualified audit opinion for previous fiscal year's financial statements. VAFC is equal to 1 if auditors are voluntarily changed, and 0 otherwise. MAFR is equal to 1 if auditors are mandatorily rotated, and 0 otherwise.
Relation between Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation and Accruals Quality
In addition to discretionary accruals, accruals quality is another popular earnings quality measurement (Dechow and Dichev, 2002; Dechow et al., 2011) . In this section, we investigate whether mandatorily rotated new auditors under MAFR produce higher accruals quality.
First, we test the association between MAFR and accruals quality and between VAFC and accruals quality. Table 7 reports the association between MAFR and accruals quality for the full sample. Consistent with previous results on discretionary accruals in Table 6 , we find that the coefficients for both (VAFC+FGCO*VAFC) and (MAFR+FGCO*MAFR) are significantly negative at the 1 percent level, suggesting that both voluntarily auditorchanged and mandatorily auditor-rotated firms have relatively higher accruals quality compared with auditorunchanged firms. The negative association between auditor change and rotation and accruals quality is also more pronounced for firms receiving a first-time going-concern audit opinion on the basis of the finding that the coefficients of both FGCO*VAFC and FGCO*MAFR are significantly negative at the 1 percent levels. Next, we test whether or not the negative association between MAFR and accruals quality is stronger than that between VAFC and accruals quality. F-test results show that the difference in coefficients between (VAFC+FGCO*VAFC) and (MAFR+FGCO*MAFR) or between FGCO*VAFC and FGCO*MAFR is significant at the 1 percent level. Considering that the coefficient (-1.213) of (MAFR+FGCO*MAFR) is more negative than that (-0.375) of (VAFC+FGCO*VAFC) and that the coefficient (-1.194) of FGCO*MAFR is more negative than that (-0.427) of FGCO*VAFC, the F-test results above suggest that firms audited by mandatorily rotated auditors have higher accruals quality in their initial audits compared with firms audited by voluntarily changed auditors. In particular, the results are more pronounced for FGCO firms under MAFR and support the previous findings in Table 6 . See Appendix for variable definitions. No of Obs. 8,889 ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test).
Dependent variable is Accrual Quality, which is studentized residual estimated following McNichols (2002) . GCO is equal to 1 for firms that received a going-concern opinion for the current fiscal year's financial statements, and 0 otherwise 0. FGCO is equal to 1 for firms that received a going-concern opinion for the current fiscal year's financial statements but an unqualified audit opinion for previous fiscal year's financial statements. VAFC is equal to 1 if auditors are voluntarily changed, and 0 otherwise. MAFR is equal to 1 if auditors are mandatorily rotated, and 0 otherwise.
Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, we develop three subsamples from the full sample: 1) financially distressed firms, 2) only auditor-changed firms, and 3) financially distressed and auditor-changed firms. As mentioned previously, financially distressed firms are defined as firms with a net loss or negative operating cash flows. Then, we re-conduct the same regression in Table 6 for each subsample. The results are shown in Table 8 . Columns 3 and 4 in Table 8 report the regression results for financially distressed firms. According to the results, the coefficient (-0.399) of (MAFR + FGCO*MAFR) is negative and significant at the 1 percent level, whereas the coefficient (-0.097) of (VAFC + FGCO*VAFC) is negative and significant at the 5 percent level. Additionally, the F-test for the coefficients between (VAFC + FGCO*VAFC) and (MAFR + FGCO*MAFR) is still significant at the 5 percent level (p-value: 0.017). Collectively, these results support the previous findings that newly rotated auditors with a fresh eye under MAFR more conservatively conduct their initial financial statement audits.
Next, we re-conduct the regression for the subsample of only auditor-changed firms (i.e., firms that voluntarily or mandatorily switched their auditors), and the results are shown in columns 5 and 6 in Table 8 . The Clute Institute Consistent with the previous results in Table 6 , we find that the coefficient (-0.353) of (MAFR + FGCO*MAFR) is significantly negative at the 1 percent level, suggesting that newly rotated auditors under MAFR are more likely to deter their clients' income-increasing behavior in their initial audits. Lastly, for the subsample consisting of financially distressed and auditor-changed firms, we consistently find that the coefficient (-0.330) of (MAFR + FGCO*MAFR) is significant at the 5 percent level. See Appendix for variable definitions.
Taken together, in line with the arguments made by proponents of MAFR, we find that newly rotated auditors under MAFR are more conservative in conducting their first-year financial statement audits compared with newly switched auditors under VAFC, thus deterring firms' income-increasing behavior. 2,000 682 ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). Dependent variable is DA, which is discretionary accruals measured following Kothari et al. (2005) . GCO is equal to 1 for firms that received a going-concern opinion for the current fiscal year's financial statements, and 0 otherwise 0. FGCO is equal to 1 for firms that received a going-concern opinion for the current fiscal year's financial statements but an unqualified audit opinion for previous fiscal year's financial statements. VAFC is equal to 1 if auditors are voluntarily changed, and 0 otherwise. MAFR is equal to 1 if auditors are mandatorily rotated, and 0 otherwise. Financially distressed firms are defined those that have a net loss or negative operating cash flows.
CONCLUSION
The recent shock to the capital markets from the global financial crisis after the high-profile accounting scandals in the beginning of the 21 st century caused regulators and policy makers to again pay more attention to mandatory audit firm rotation as a solution to enhance auditor independence and subsequently improve financial reporting quality. In this study, we investigate whether a difference exists in audit quality and financial reporting quality between mandatory audit firm rotation and voluntary audit firm change from the perspectives of audit opinion decision-making to financially distressed firms, discretionary accruals, and accruals quality. The Clute Institute APPENDIX
1.
Variables used in the GCO model
Variable Definition
FGCO
Equal to 1 for firms that received a going-concern opinion for the current fiscal year's financial statements but an unqualified audit opinion for previous fiscal year's financial statements the previous ones, and 0 otherwise; VAFC Equal to 1 if auditors are voluntarily changed, and 0 otherwise MAFR Equal to 1 if auditors are mandatorily rotated, and 0 otherwise SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets 
